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Lorne H. Abugov*

Televising Court Trials in
Canada: We Stand on Guard
for a Legal Apocalypse

I. Introduction
Four years ago an eminent Canadian jurist denounced the presence
of a CBC television crew filming trial participants as they emerged
from his courtroom at Osgoode Hall. Chief Justice G. A. Gale of
the Ontario Supreme Court found the incident "quite offensive"
and bid the crew to leave the hallway and the courthouse "because I
was satisfied that their operations constituted an interference with
the administration of justice." '
Four years later the Canadian position on the presence of news
cameras in the courts and within its precincts has remained
unaltered, unbending and, worst of all, uncontroverted. A blanket
prohibition exists in every Canadian courtroom against the use for
publication or otherwise of any news or still camera. Failure to heed
the proscription invites the sting of contempt law and, one would
assume, from the words of Chief Justice Gale, the eternal
damnation of the Canadian judiciary.
But four years hence -

perhaps sooner, possibly later -

the

television news cameras will reappear in the august upper rotunda of
Osgoode Hall. And this time, by every indication, the broadcast
industry will settle for nothing less than unimpeded access to cover
trial proceedings, subject only to court-imposed limitations
governing the press. It is frankly naive to believe that the wave of
critical reaction to the television ban that has swept across the
United States during the past three years will crest and subside
without leaving any mark on the Canadian legal community.
In light of recent United States cases like State v. Solorzano2 and
State v. Zamora,3 an examination of which will form an integral
part of this paper, it is clear that the television industry is on the
*Lorne H. Abugov, LL.B. Dalhousie 1980. This paper was submitted in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for "Law and the Press", a course at Dalhousie
Law School.
1. G. Gale, The Problem of Television in the Courtrooms (1974), 8 Law Soc'y of
U.C. Gaz. 4 at 4.
2. (1976), 92 Nev. 144; 546 P.2d 1295
3. (1977), No. 77-25123-A (Dade County Cir. Ct.)
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threshold of gaining entry into that nation's courtrooms on a
full-time basis. Once this occurs, and 14 states have already granted
their permission, 4 televised civil and criminal trials will become
second nature to Americans and, owing to the nature of North
American broadcasting, to Canadians as well. That Canadians may
soon be able to tune into American network broadcasts of trial and
appeals cases may de facto settle the issue in this country well
before it comes up for judicial determination. Therefore, Canadians
concerned about the advent of televised court proceedings and its
effect on the pursuit of justice must prepare in advance to ensure
maximum harmony between the electronic media and the bench.
This article then will advocate the view that Canadian courts can
ill-afford to sit by idly while a legal revolution of sorts rages south
of the border. Back in 1974, when Chief Justice Gale addressed the
Provincial Judges of Ontario, one could hardly take issue with the
smug, slightly reassuring view that television cameras would never
be permitted inside the courtroom to darken the fairness, dignity and
integrity of the proceedings. Today, that view is being tested
empirically in the United States and, almost without exception, is
being found to have a hollow ring. 5 This article will urge Canadian
jurists to cast a probing eye south to developments in the United
States, where daily recognition is being accorded by the American
bar and bench to the media's claim that cameras in the courtroom
are not inherently perverse to a defendant's right to a fair trail.
It will be necessary first to examine the law of the land in the
United States in order to sketch the outlines of the courtroom
television controversy. Then, the historical prelude to recent
state-level decisions allowing television will be viewed. The
traditional ban on televising trials, first enunciated by the American
Bar Association in 19526 and enshrined in law by the United States
Supreme Court in the Estes v. Texas case, 7 will be discussed along
with the maverick response by three states. 8 An in-depth look at the
Estes judgement will furnish arguments pro and con and
4. The states which either allow televised court trials or are conducting
experiments on the subject are: Colorado, Florida, Kentucky, Minnesota,
Montana, New Hampshire, Ohio, Wisconsin, Nevada, Washington
5. Infra, the discussions of the Soloryano case at p. 34, and of the Zamora case at
p. 38
6. ABA Cannons of Judicial Ethics No. 35; first adopted in 1937 and extended to
include television in 1952
7. (1964), 381 U.S. 532

8. Colorado, Oklahoma and Texas
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demonstrate how polarized the American legal community has
grown over the issue, what with certain states aligning themselves
with the media while others line up alongside the U.S. Supreme
Court. Several experimental state plans will be assessed to
determine the successes and failures of televising court proceedings.
And, finally, a proposed set of guidelines will be presented for
possible use by Canadian courts when - as opposed to if - the day
arrives that cameras in the courtroom are a commonplace
occurrence as opposed to their present status of unwelcome
interlopers barring the path to justice.
II. The Law of the Land Says "No" . ..
If the television news camera is to attain a permanent spot inside the
Canadian and American courtroom, two formidable obstacles must
be hurdled. First, it must be recognized that any state which permits
the filming of a trial does so in flagrant and obvious disregard of the
views of the United States Supreme Court. 9 Secondly, allowing
telecasts of court proceedings directly challenges Canon 3A(7) of
the American Bar Association's Code of Judicial Conduct formerly
Canon 35, of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. While the former
restraint would seem the more imposing, the ABA's canons in this
context have, since the earliest days of radio and then television,
been seen as the real backbone in the campaign against the use of
news cameras in the courts. In concert the two have effectively
stymied any attempt of the television industry to secure a foothold
within the courtrooms of the nation until very recently. 1 0
The natural starting point for a discussion of the broad outlines of
the camera-in-the-courtroom controversy is the 84-page decision of
the U.S. Supreme Court in the Estes case, wherein the court held by
a 5-4 vote that the mere presence of a television camera inside the
courtroom during the trial invokes a presumption that the accused is
denied his constitutional right to a fair trial under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The court had some difficulty in pinpointing the exact evils of
televising court trials, as reflected in its conclusion that television
cameras are an unsettling influence in the courtroom even though
"one cannot put his finger on its specific mischief."" As Mr.
9. (1964), 381 U.S. 532
10. Supra, note 5
11. (1964), 381 U.S. 532 at 544 (per Mr. Justice Clark delivering the opinion of
the Court)
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Justice William 0. Douglas observed, it is not the novelty or
uncertainty surrounding the introduction of cameras in the court that
posed the real danger, but rather television's "insidious influences
which it puts to work in the administration of justice." 12 Mr. Justice

Tom Clark, speaking for the majority, felt that televising trials was
a procedure "inherently lacking in due process"' 3 and appropriate
for the principle in Rideau v. Louisiana,14 wherein no indentifiable
showing of prejudice to the accused need be shown to warrant
contempt. In Rideau, the telecast of a 20 minute jailhouse
confession by the accused to charges of robbery, kidnap and murder
turned his trial into a farce and resulted in a denial of due process
when Rideau's request for a change of venue was turned down.
Three specific categories of harm arise in connection with the
television broadcast of trials. The court held that barring
technological advances in the state of the art, television coverage
could not but: a) physically disrupt the smooth flow of a trial; b)
psychologically alter the balance of the proceedings by affecting the
various participants in the trial and c) legally prejudice the accused
by infringing on his right to a fair trial and by discriminatorily
subjecting him to television scrutiny. These physical, psychological
and legal objections to the camera's presence in the courtroom form
the broad, overarching bounds to the controversy, from which all
other arguments arise.
The television industry's challenge and the court's response are
traditionally framed in the language of constitutional considerations. Simply stated, in order to determine whether a trial may or
may not be televised the rights of the defendant and participants in
the trial must be juxtaposed against the rights of the media. Four
separate and conflicting constitutional guarantees have been held to
govern the television dispute. There are: 1) the right of privacy of
the accused, the witnesses and the jurors; 2) the right of freedom of
the press; 3) the right of public trial and 4) the right of the accused to
a fair trial. 15

12. W. Douglas, The Public Trial and the Free Press (1960), 33 Rocky Mt. L.
Rev. I at 1
13. (1964), 381 U.S. 532 at 542-3
14. (1962), 373 U.S. 723
15. For an excellent discussion see: S. Kulwin, Televised Trials: Constitutional
Constraints, Practical Implications, and State Experimentation (1977-78), 9
Loyola U. of Chi. L. Rev. 910

698 The Dalhousie Law Journal

1. The right of privacy of the accused, the witnesses and the
jurors...
While the United States Constitution makes no express mention of a
right of privacy, case law has established that privacy is implicit in
several amendments. It has been defined as the right to foster and
preserve one's "inviolate personality" 16 which itself has been
judicially interpreted as representing a person's ability to maintain
"independence, dignity and integrity." ' 17 The court has also .held
that when ". . . one becomes identified with an occurence of public
or general interest he emerges from his seclusion and it is not an
invasion of his 'right of privacy' to publish his photograph or
otherwise to give publicity to his connection with that event."l 8 A
further caveat states that the law refuses to "recognize a right of
privacy in connection with that which is inherently a public
matter." 19 In Craig v. Harney, the Supreme Court stated:
"A trial is a public event. What transpires in the court room is
public property. Those who see and hear what transpired can report
20
it with impunity."
The right of privacy, then, would appear an inadequate constitutional vehicle to bar news cameras from the courts and must
therefore be argued in a supportive capacity. Thus, the courts have
held that "privacy interests at times must yield to other compelling
constitional considerations." 21
2. The right offreedom of the press...
The foremost constitutional weapon in a newsman's arsenal is the
argument that by forcing him to check the tools of his trade outside
the courtroom, the court is depriving him of his freedom to cover
newsworthy incidents occurring in a public place. 22 The court has,
however, repeatedly affirmed the right of the television newsman to
attend a trial and report the goings-on therein. His position is no
different than that of a newspaperman, in that neither has an
16. Id. at 914

17. Id.
18. In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35

of the Canons ofJudicialEthics (1956),

296 P. 2d 465 at 470 (Colo. Sup. Ct. en banc)
19. Id.
20. (1946), 331 U.S. 367 and 374
21. Supra, note 15 at 918
22. U.S. Const. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law .
freedom of speech, or of the press .... "

.

. abridging the
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unlimited right of access to proceedings as Mr. Justice Clark
explained in Estes:
... The television reporter has the same privilege. All are
entitled to the same rights as the general public. The news
reporter is not permitted to bring his typewriter or printing press.
When the advances in these arts permit reporting by printing
press or by television without
2 3 their present hazards to a fair trial
we will have another case.
Restrictive orders of the court, such as that which bars the use of
cameras in the courtroom, are said to be constitutionally valid when
news coverage of a trial results in "an imminent, not merely a
likely, threat to the administration of justice. The danger must not
be remote or even probable; it must immediately imperil. ' 2 4 This
test emerged from cases which dealt with prejudicial pretrial
publicity and not, as here, to television coverage inside the
courtroom where the test is held to be less stringent. Televised
coverage of a trial can be outlawed when there is potential
possibility of a threat to the proceedings, as opposed to an
immediate threat that a miscarriage of justice will ensue. For these
reasons, the court has not seen fit to find the banishment of news
cameras to be a curtailment of a reporter's constitutional right to
freedom of the press.
3. The right ofpublic trial...
Reporters have also alleged that barring their cameras from the court
amounts to a contravention of the public's right to know of activities
conducted inside the courtroom. This claim, mind you, derives
itself from a misapplication of the basic Sixth Amendment
guarantee and the rationale behind its enactment. The right, says the
court, is one adhering to the individual accused; it is designed for
his exclusive benefit and protection. 25 It was implemented to
safeguard the accused from Star Court-style judicial proceedings
and, by corollary, to guarantee his inviolable right to a fair and open
hearing. Where the television reporter's claim enters into this
interpretation is not readily apparent. Even adherents to the
23. (1964), 381 U.S. 532 at 540
24. U.S. v. Dickinson (1972), 465 F.2d 496 at 507 quoting from Craig v. Harvey
(1946), 331 U.S. 367 at 376
25. United Press Associations v. Volente (1954), 308 N.Y. 71; 123 N.E. 2d 777
(Ct. App.)

700 The Dalhousie Law Journal

misconstrued stance outlined above would have a difficult time in
convincing the Supreme Court that the public's right to know is
sufficiently absolute as to warrant infringing on the accused's right
to a fair trial. For it is this right, and specifically the due process
clause tucked into the Fourteenth Amendment, that ultimately
directed the court in Estes to a finding in the accused's favour.
4. The right of the accused to afair trial...
Whether it be borne of a true concern for the rights of the accused,
26
or, as the late Mr. Justice Jerome Frank suggested cynically, out
of a fear of detracting from the dignity of the court and its slightly
pompous actors, trial judges traditionally have supported the ban on
courtroom television.
Prohibiting courtroom television, as has been shown, can only be
justified from a constitutional standpoint if it can be shown that the
appearance of cameras would threaten a fair trial. This right of the
accused, the court has held, assumes paramountcy over those
already discussed in the context of courtroom broadcasting. Thus,
the Supreme Court in Estes could frame the issue narrowly as "only
whether petitioner was tried in a manner which comports with the
due process requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment.' '27 Due
process has been deemed to have been denied in instances where the
28
accused's trial was "shocking to the universal sense of justice."
The ultimate question, therefore, is this: Are the physical,
psychological and legal effects of courtroom television sufficiently
detrimental to the course of a trial as to be shocking to a universal
sense of justice? The court in Estes said yes.
Although they had never directly confronted the issue before, the
court was predisposed by the existence of the ABA's Canon 35,
itself the embodiment of almost 40 years of fruitful discussion on
the topic by ABA members who foresaw that in-court news cameras
could become a hotly-contested free press - fair trial issue.

26. Rodell, T.V. or No T.V. in Court?, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1964, S 6
(magazine), at 103, quoted in Goldman and Larson, News Camera in the
Courtroom During State v. Solorzano: End to the Estes Mandate? (1978),

10

S.W.U.L. Rev. 2001 at 2006 n. 31
27. (1964), 381 U.S. 532 at 535 (per Mr. Justice Clark delivering the opinion of
the Court)
28. D. Fretz, Cameras in the Courtroom(Spring, 1978), 14 Trial at 28-9

Televising Court Trials in Canada 701

III. HistoricalPreludeto the Estes Decision.
1. Canon 35: Its Originand Its Role
Since its inception in 1937, the ABA's Canon 35 of its Canons of
Judicial Ethics has led a checkered existence. It has at times been
extolled mightily as the watchdog of courtroom impartiality, while
at others complainants have publicly rued the day it was drafted.
Journalists have always seen it as a non-legal smokescreen, a
monkey wrench in the otherwise cooperative-working relationship
between the media and the courts. What follows then is a brief
chronology of the events leading up to and arising out of the
adoption of Canon 35:
1927 The Maryland Court of Appeals affirms contempt charges
against Baltimore newsmen who violated a court order
banning news photography during a murder trial. The
judicial restraint order is held not to be an abridgement of
freedom of the press. 2 9
1932 The ABA is presented with a draft resolution seeking to ban
outright the use of radio recording instruments and the
practice of radio broadcasting trials.
1935 The Supreme Court refuses to reverse the trial verdict in the
Lindbergh baby kidnapping case. Accused Bruno Hauptmann was victimized by the presence of over 80030newsmen
whose antics turned the trial into a media fishbowl.
1937 Prodded by the circus atmosphere of the Hauptmann trial, the
ABA House of Delegates first adopts Canon 35, which reads:
Proceedings in court should be conducted with dignity and
decorum. The taking of photographs in the court room during
sessions of the court or recesses between sessions, and the
broadcasting of court proceedings are calculated to detract from
the essential dignity of the proceedings, degrade the court and
create misconceptions with respect thereto in the mind of the
public and should not be permitted.
1941 A further proscription against use of radio in the courtroom
for newsgathering purposes is incorporated into Canon 35.
1952 The ABA bans television cameras from the courts and
proscribes televising of court proceedings. Canon 35 is
amended to read:
Improper Publicizing of Court Proceedings: Proceedings in court
should be conducted with fitting dignity and decorum. The taking
29. Exparte Sturm (1927), 136 A. 312 (App. Ct.)
30. Hauptmann v. New Jersey (1935), 296 U.S. 649, denying cert. to (sub nom.)
State v. Hauptmann (1935), 115 N.J.L. 412 (Ct. Err. and App.)
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of photographs in the courtroom during sessions of the courts or
recesses between sessions, and the broadcasting or televising of
court proceedings are calculated to detract from the essential
dignity of the proceedings, distract the witness in giving his
testimony, degrade the court and create misconceptions with
respect thereto in the mind of the public and should not be
permitted.
1954 A special Bar-Media committee on Free Press - Fair Trial
reports that television in the courtroom would impose undue
policing duties on the trial judge and have an injurious
psychological impact on the trial actors.
1956 The State of Colorado conducts an investigation into the
propriety of Canon 35's television ban. The state Supreme
Court holds that criminal and civil trials may be televised at
3
the discretion and under the supervision of the trial judge. 1
1958 Partially in response to the Colorado challenge, a special
ABA investigative committee reports that television is still
unfit for in-court use, and suggests a revision of Canon 35 to
read, in part:
. . . The taking of photographs in the courtroom during the
progress of judicial proceedings or during any recess thereof and
the transmitting or sound recording of such proceedings for
broadcasting by radio or television introduces extraneous
influences which tend to have a detrimental psychological effect
on the participants and to divert them from the proper objectives
of the trial; they should not be permitted.
1965 The Supreme Court in Estes endorses Canon 35 and notes its
near-universal adoption by state Supreme Courts.
1972 The ABA adopts by unanimous vote of the House of
Delegates a reworking of Canon 35 known as Canon 3A(7).
It reads:
A judge should prohibit broadcasting, televising, recording or
taking photographs in the courtroom and areas immediately
adjacent thereto during sessions of court or recesses between
sessions, except that a judge may authorize:
a) the use of electronic or photographic means for presentation of
evidence, for the perpetuation of a record, or for other purposes
of judicial administration;
b) the broadcasting, televising, recording or photographing of
investitive, ceremonial, or naturalization proceedings;
c) the photographic or electronic recording and reproduction of
appropriate court proceedipgs under the following conditions:
31. In re HearingsConcerning Canon 35 of the Canons of JudicialEthics (1956),
132 Co. 591; 296 P.2d 465 (Sup. Ct. en banc)
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1) the means of recording will not distract participants or
impair the dignity of the proceedings;
2) the parties have consented and the consent to being
depicted or recorded has been obtained from each witness
appearing in the recording and production;
3) the reproduction will not be exhibited until after the
proceeding has been concluded and all direct appeals have been
exhausted; and
4) the reproduction will be exhibited only for instructional
purposes in educational institutions.
Notwithstanding its potent spell on the judges of the nation,
Canon 3A(7) and its predecessor Canon 35 do not now carry the
weight of law, nor have they ever done so.3 2 Rather they have been
styled as merely ABA-sanctioned statutory schemes. The court in
Lyles v. State, to be discussed later, entrenched that viewpoint in
law by characterizing the canons in the following manner:
The adoption of the canons of ethics by the courts did not give the
canons force of law. They are nothing more than a system of
principles of exemplary conduct and good character . . . They

are subject to modification to meet the condition of changing
33
times in keeping with the constitutional rights of the people.
As already noted, Colorado, along with Texas and Oklahoma stood
alone as holdouts amongst all the remaining states which had, by
virtue of legislative enactments or court rules, already adopted
Canon 35 prior to the Estes case.
2. The Maverick States: Clash of Perspectives
Certain state courts in the mid- 1950s were not prepared to conceed
axiomatic status to Canon 35 without first reappraising its basic
premise that photography and broadcasting during a criminal trial
was inherently offensive to the accused's right of fair trial and due
process. Colorado was at the forefront of the maverick element. In
1956, a Colorado district court and, shortly thereafter, the Colorado
Supreme Court, both held that the underlying rationale behind
Canon 35 was not merely questionable but wholly incorrect.
First, in Graham v. People, the district court permitted newsmen
to take sound on film of the trial against the stated desires of the
defendant, who had allegedly killed 44 people by placing a bomb
34
aboard an airplane in order to collect his mother's life insurance.
32. Deupree v. Garnett(1954), 277 P.2d 168 at 175 (Okla. Sup. Ct.)

33. (1958), 330 P.2d 734 at 738 (Okla. Crim. Ct. App.)
34. (1956), 134 Col. 290; 302 P.2d 737 (Sup. Ct. en banc)
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Friendly and Goldfarb describe the aftermath of the trial
proceedings which featured a newscamera booth in the rear of the
courtroom and subsequent use of film footage on the nightly news
telecasts:
When the trial was over, the presiding judge, the jury foreman,
the attorneys on both sides and the defendant's wife said that, to
their knowledge, the broadcast coverage had not distracted
anyone and had not interfered with the fairness of the trial.
Veteran court reporters did not detect any awareness by witnesses
of the broadcast operation. And the jury 3foreman's
comment was:
5
"Frankly, I had forgotten it was there."
Cognizant of the finding in the Graham case, the state Supreme
Court had occasion to test the waters for itself that same year when
it ruled on a petition to amend Canon 35. Speaking for the court in
In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics, Mr. Justice Otto Moore ruled that criminal court
proceedings in Colorado would henceforth be governed by an
amendment of Canon 35 allowing radio and television broadcasting
into the courtroom at the discretion of the trial judge and subject to
36
the consent of all trial principals.
Mr. Justice Moore framed the issue of the validity of Canon 35 as
being a simple case of fact or fancy:
We are concerned with realities and not with conjecture. Canon
35 assumes the fact to be that use of camera, radio and television
instruments must in every case interfere with the administration
of justice . .. If the assumption of fact is justified the canon

should be continued and enforced. If
the assumption is not
37
justified the canon cannot be sustained.
Over the course of the hearings all manner of media technology
was tested in the courtroom with an eye to gauging the potential and
real disruptive effects on the administration of justice. The
conclusion, to the chagrin of the ABA, was that "the assumption of
38
facts as stated in the canon is wholly without support in reality." ,
There was nothing connected with the telecast which was
obtrusive. The dignity or decorum of the court was not in the
least disturbed. Many persons entered and retired from the
35. Friendly and Goldfarb, Crime and Publicity (New York: The Twentieth
Century Fund, 1967) at 234 quoting W. Monroe, Villanova Law School
Symposium, April 16, 1966
36. (1956), 132 Col. 591; 296 P.2d 465 (Sup. Ct. en banc)
37. (1956), 296 P.2d 465 (Sup. Ct. en banc)
38. Id.
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courtrooms without being aware that a live telecast was in
39
progress.
The court reasoned that the cooperative efforts of the bench and
the electronic media, the former in a scrutineer's capacity and the
latter through pooled resources and a heightened sense of social
conscience and responsibility, could preserve courtroom decorum
without sacrificing an accused to the toughest of all jurors - the
television audience. History seems to have borne out that
conclusion. In the 22 years since the Colorado reference, not one
trial verdict has been toppled owing to the presence of courtroom
4
television. 0

The Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals travelled the same road
two years later in Lyles v. State. 4 1 There, as in the Colorado
reference, the trial judge was vested with full discretion to admit or
bar news cameras on a case by case basis. Calling the defendant's
claim of television prejudice a "baseless boogey (sic) constructed
out of pure conjecture," the court, in no uncertain terms, handed
the television industry a mandate they had for so long sought. 42 Or
so it must have seemed at the time. Inexplicably, the court
retrenched its position the following year, reverting back to a
pro-Canon 35 posture in prohibiting statewide the broadcast of all
criminal trials. 43 A 1961 criminal trial, Cody v. State, 44 further

muddled the situation when it harkened back to the ruling in Lyles
and found that the decision for or against television was solely in the
hands of the sitting judge. Finally, in 1974, Oklahoma buried the
memory of Lyles by incorporating into its own canons of judicial
ethics the ABA's Canon 3A(7).
Meanwhile, in Texas, the courts had never heeded Canon 35's
proscription on television, preferring instead to entrust trial judges
with discretionary powers to regulate trial television. The
liberal-minded approach boomeranged badly during the ill-fated
trial of Billie Sol Estes in 1962, a trial in which every conceiveable
nightmare the legal community might conjure up regarding the
abuse of television seemingly came to pass.
39. Id.
40. Goldman and Larsen, News Camera in the Courtroom During State v.
Soloyano: End to the Estes Mandate? (1978), 10 S.W.U.L. Rev. 2001 at 2018.
41. (1958), 330 P.2d 734
42. Id. at 742
43. Okla. Stat. Am. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 4 (1966)
44. (1961), 361 P.2d 307 (Okla. Crim. Ct. of App.)
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IV. Estes v. States of Texas...
1. Trial or Mardi Gras?
In June, 1965 the United States Supreme Court overturned a
conviction for swindling against the appellant Billie Sol Estes on the
ground that massive trial publicity, including television cameras
inside the courtroom, had severely hampered the accused's right to
a fair trial. The ABA's Canon 35 had never before seemed so vital,
so tailor-made to any kind of courtroom abuse as to those that
transpired in Estes. Canon 35, one will recall, did not mince words
in declaring that "broadcasting and televising court proceedings are
calculated to detract from the essential dignity of the proceedings,
...
degrade the court and create misconceptions with respect
thereto in the mind of the public." 4 5 A nonpartisan observer at the
trial would not likely have quibbled with the unbending language of
the Canon for it must have been drafted with a tawdry courtroom
spectacle like Estes in mind.
At trial, Estes had moved to bar live telecasts of the
proceedings, but the bid was rejected on the basis that the state did
not subscribe to Canon 35 and permitted courtroom broadcasting at
the trial judge's discretion. Upon his subsequent conviction Estes
appealed on grounds that his constitutional right to a fair trial
according to due process was violated by television coverage. The
New York Times described the carnival atmosphere of the trial in
its September 25, 1962 edition in the following manner:
A television motor van, big as an intercontinental bus was parked
outside the courthouse and the second floor courtroom was a
forest of equipment. Two television cameras had been set up
inside the bar and four marked cameras were aligned just outside
the gates. A microphone stuck its 12-inch snout inside the jury
box, now occupied by an overflow of reporters from the press
table, and three microphones confronted Judge Dunagan on his
bench. Cables and wires snaked all over the floor.
For all the apparent mayhem that prevailed in the Estes courtroom
during the October, 1962 deliberations of the Texas Circuit Court,
two things must be kept in mind for the sake of fairness. First off,
all the manoeuvring of the newsmen was done under the watchful
supervision of the trial judge who maintained a firm rein over the
proceedings, relatively speaking. Second, the Supreme Court, in
overturning Estes' sentence, could find no nexus whatsoever
45. Supra, p. 11 for Canon 35 as it read in 1952.
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between the activities of the newsmen and any direct prejudice to
the accused's right to a fair trial. 46 But this notwithstanding, even
dissenters on the Supreme Court in Estes conceeded that television
coverage had done the defendant a disservice. 4 7 It is essential, then,
to assess the judgements in Estes, to enumerate the multifarious
complaints lodged against television therein and to sift out the most
noteworthy. Those that remain as bona fide can then be weighed
against the positive factors accruing out of the broadcasting of trials.
Thus, no mention will be made of Chief Justice Earl Warren's
complaint, for example, that taped coverage of the trial preempted
"The Tonight Show" on the Texas NBC affiliate. 48 This
"degradation by association" argument is trifling and is subsumed
under the larger species of complaint which argues that trial
telecasts will lend judicial proceedings the flavour of basic
entertainment. The framework for discussion will be the same as
that suggested by the case itself, namely a breakdown of the
objections into three categories: physical, psychological and legal.
2. Analysis of Estes: The Case Against Television
It was contended by the majority in Estes that the use of television in
the trial process injected "an irrelevant factor into the court
proceedings. ' 49 This would seem to indicate that the Court's
holding against television was at least partly based on the medium's
nuisance potential and not wholly on the nefarious and prejudicial
impact it had on the particular defendant's right of fair trial.
Goldman and Larson observed this when they commented that the
bottom line "in all of the Court's criticisms was that the presence of
television could not materially contribute to the ascertainment of
truth, and arguably could vitiate the finding altogether." 5 0 Nowhere
is this attitude of the Court more apparent than in its criticisms of
television for physically disrupting the "sober search for the
51
truth.''
(a) Physical disruptionof trialproceedings . . .
At the root of this particular problem is the basic observation that no
46. (1964), 381 U.S. 532 at 544 (per Mr. Justice Clark delivering the opinion of
the Court)
47. See the decisions of Brennon, J. and White, J.
48. (1964), 381 U.S. 532 at 571 (per Warren, C.J.)
49. Id. at 544 (per Mr. Justice Clark delivering the opinion of the Court)
50. Supra, note 40 at 2024-5
51. (1964), 381 U.S. 532 at 551 (opinion of the Court)
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one, not even a trial judge, can do two things at once and do them
well. Is the presence of television cameras in the courtroom a
guarantee of shoddily administered justice since a trial judge must
also assume the guise of television producer? In Estes, Chief Justice
Warren observed that the judge's attention was distracted from trial
since he was compelled on seven occasions to make rulings on
television coverage and the conduct of newsmen. Chief Justice
Warren commented that it was impossible for any trial participant
not to have observed the presence of the media since the "snouts of
the four television cameras protruded through the opening in the
booth." 52z Specifically, the Court has always been chary of having
to pander in any way to the television industry since this is outright
evidence of diverting one's energies from the appointed task of
administering justice. Thus, any evidence that extra lighting was
required or abnormal modification to the courtroom was necessary
will predispose the Court to a finding of media culpability. The
standard contention of the bench is that the physical disruptions
caused by television shatter the decorum of the trial process.
But most of the arguments raised with regard to physical
disruption of the trial were prefaced with the observation that
advancing technology could solve the problem at a later date. Mr.
Justice White for example dissented on the basis that the sheer
paucity of information on the impact of television precluded him
from barring courtroom television on a permanent basis. Even Chief
Justice Warren concluded that ". . . the evil of televised trials, as
demonstrated by this case, lies not in the noise and appearance of
the cameras, but in the trial participant's awareness that they are
being televised." 53 A study of the more recent experimental cases
will provide answers to the questions regarding current TV
technology. What is far more difficult to ascertain is the
psychological impact on the trial participants to which Warren, C.
J. alludes.
(b) Psychologicaldistractionof trialparticipants.
To fully understand the complexities of this aspect of the problem it
is helpful to leave Estes for the moment and compare two recent
statements by American judges on this topic. Colorado Chief Justice
Edward Pringle has presided over televised trials in that state since
52. Id. at 568
53. Id. at 570
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1956. He recently observed that: "I've never seen jurors become
upset . . . I've never seen witnesses show off

. .

. If the judge is

going to showboat, he's going to showboat anyways." ' 54 In
contrast, the Honourable Donald R. Fretz, an American trial judge
and a leading exponent of a cautious approach to courtroom
television reported that:
Eastern Airlines is said to be appealing a $1.6 million judgement
against it on the ground that jurors were so thrilled with being on
a TV news show that they were "improperly motivated to return
a sufficiently spectacular and newsworthy verdict in the hopes
that they would receive further television
and expectation
55
coverage. "
The potential psychological effects of stationing news cameras in
the courtroom has always been the most contentious and the least
understood of all the detriments imputed to courtroom TV. This is
as true today, as the conflicting quotes illustrate, as it was during the
Estes trial. Perhaps the attorneys for the State of Texas were more
realistic than the Supreme Court when they argued that the
psychological ramifications of courtroom broadcasting were for the
56
psychologists to fret over, and not the courts.
In response, the court contended that it didn't take a psychologist
to appreciate the self-evident range of potential harm that the mere
presence of newscameras could trigger. 57 Mr. Justice Clark's most
memorable argument in Estes was his enumeration of the
detrimental psychological impact of TV on each of the trial actors
- jurors, witnesses, judge and defendant. To this list one might
also add the viewing audience which, according to the court, would
suffer from television's inaccurate portrayal of the trial process.
Capsulized, the majority's arguments went as follows:
(i) Jurors:
• . . potential impact of television on the jurors is perhaps of the
greatest significance.
1) From the moment the trial judge announces that a case will
be televised it becomes a cause c6lebre. The whole community
including prospective jurors, becomes interested in all the morbid
details surrounding it . . . Every juror carries with him into the
54. Stone and Edlin, T. V. or Not T. V.: Televised and PhotographicCoverage of

Trials (1977-78), 29 Mercer L. Rev. 1119 at 1132
55. F. Graham and D. Fretz, Cameras in the Courtroom:A Dialogue (1978), 64

A.B.A.J. 545 at 550
56. (1964), 381 U.S. 532 at 541

57. Id. at 550
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jury box these solemn facts and thus increases the chance of
prejudice that is possible in every criminal case.
2) The televised jurors cannot help but feel the pressures of
knowing that friends and neighbours have their eyes upon them.
If the community be hostile to an accused a televised juror,
realizing that he must return to neighbours who saw the trial
themselves, may well be led 'not to hold the balance nice, clear
and true between the State and the accused...
3) . . . those of us who know juries realize the problem of
'jury distraction' . . . It is the awareness of the fact of telecasting
that is felt by the juror throughout the trial . . . not only will a

juror's eyes be fixed on the camera, but also his mind will be
preoccupied with the telecasting rather than with the testimony.
4) . . . Jurors would return home and turn on the TV if only to
see how they appeared upon it . . . Moreover, they would be

subjected to the broadcast commentary and criticism and perhaps
the well-meant advice of friends, relatives and inquiring strangers
who recognized them on the streets.
5) Finally, new trials plainly would be jeopardized in that
often have seen and heard the original trial
potential jurors will 58
when it was telecast.
Implicit in the court's first three arguments are the twin notions
that television will never become a commonplace feature inside the
courtroom and that television technology will never advance
significantly beyond the level attained during the Estes trial. For
example, morbid curiousity could pose a difficulty in empanelling a
jury during the early days of courtroom broadcasting. However,
Colorado's experience has shown that once televising trials has
become an accustomed part of the public's mindset, rabid interest
quickly levels off and eliminates the problem. Likewise, Mr. Justice
Clark's second argument may apply to the most heinous of crimes
which, by their very nature, tend to incite the public's passion, but
can it be so for the more numerous cases which can safely be called
plodding and dull? Special arrangements, to be discussed later, can
be effected to ensure that jurors are insulated from caustic
comments of the community in the more notorious cases. The third
view presupposes that television hardware will never be sufficiently
sophisticated to ensure its unobtrusiveness. One need only
appreciate that courtrooms can be built with cameras constructed
right into the walls in order to discount the court's premise.
58. Id. at 545-7

Televising Court Trials in Canada 711

Regarding the court's fourth and fifth argument, especially in the
large majority of cases where the jury is not sequestered, there
seems little doubt that the problems are real and the potential harm
to the administration of justice is immeasurable. What the juror does
outside the courtroom in these instances is not a fitting area for the
court's concern.
(ii) Witnesses:
The quality of the testimony in criminal trials will often be
impaired.
1) Some may be demoralized and frightened, some cocky and
given to overstatement; memories may falter, as with anyone
speaking publically, and accuracy of statement may be severely
undermined. Embarrassment may impede the search for the truth,
as may a natural tendency toward overdramatization.
2) Indeed, the mere fact that the trial is to be televised might
render witnesses reluctant to appear and thereby impede the trial
as well as the discovery of the truth.
3) Furthermore, inquisitive strangers and 'cranks' might
approach witnesses on the street with jibes, advice or demands
for explanation of testimony. 59
The majority's thinking in all of the arguments above is that,
while each applies equally to standard press coverage, the ability of
newscameras to capture every action, every word and nuance, gives
television a much more psychologically demoralizing effect on the
jittery witness. The handy argument against these claims of the
court is that in most states no televising is allowed without the
consent of all parties involved. But this prior consent doesn't speak
to the real concern, namely the witness' state of mind once the
cameras start rolling. More empirical evidence is necessary before
the first two arguments can be properly assessed. The questions will
be raised again during discussion of the Solorzano and Zamora
cases. The third claim of the court can be discounted since the same
fate awaits any witness whose name and photograph, along with
quotes, appears in a newspaper. While this poses obvious dangers to
the juror who may incorporate out-of-courtroom advice or criticism
into his later verdict, it seems to have no appreciable impact on the
witness' testimony since: a) he may already have concluded
testimony by the time the television coverage is broadcast; b) he has
already likely given a pre-trial deposition which can be used to track
59. Id. at 547-8
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down any divergencies caused by public comment; and c) the threat
of perjury hangs over the witness and not the juror.
(iii) Judges:
A major aspect of the problem is the additional responsibilities
the presence of television places on the trial judge.
1) .

.

. laying physical interruptions aside, there is the

ever-present distraction that the mere awareness of television's
presence prompts. Judges are human beings also...
2) Telecasting is particularly bad where the judge is elected
• . . telecasting of a trial becomes a political weapon, which...
diverts his attention from the task at hand - the fair trial of the
accused.
3) . . . it is difficult to remain oblivious to the pressures that

the news media can bring to bear on them both directly and
through the shaping of public opinion.
4) . . . where one judge in a district or even a State permits

telecasting, 6the requirement that the others do the same is almost
mandatory. 0

An additional worry of the court was the potential "showboating" of a trial judge which differs from the second argument since it
derives not out of any quest for political gain but rather through the
natural "ham" in us all. In Canada, we need not worry about the
political aspect of the problem since our judges are appointed and
not selected by the viewing audience. However, the tendency
toward overdramatizing the proceedings must be a constant concern
of the bench. The first problem can be rectified quite simply through
cooperation between the media and the individual judge, usually
through the device of a pre-trial conference to map out the
limitations on television coverage. Perhaps the most difficult issue
is the added burden placed on the judge by televisions's capacity to
fan the fires of public opinion. This, however, cannot be a decisive
factor against television because it doesn't lend itself to empirical
testing and no measurements can effectively gauge the mettle of any
given judge. It must be written off as an occupational hazard.
Likewise the final point, albeit for a different reason. The practice
since Estes has been for a state Supreme Court to give a rule of
state-wide applicability on the topic of courtroom TV. Thus, when a
state grants discretion to its trial judges to permit telecasts, the
case-by-case decisions of one judge will have no bearing on similar
60. Id. at 548-9
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determinations by one or all of his colleagues. In conclusion, the
judge is possibly least affected by television in the courtroom when
full cooperation is extended his way by the television industry.
(iv) Defendants
.. . Its presence is a form of mental

. . .

harassment, resembling

a police line-up or the third degree
1) The inevitable close-ups of his gestures and expressions
during the ordeal of his trial might well transgress his personal
sensibilities, his dignity, and his ability to concentrate on the
proceedings before him - sometimes the difference between life
and death - dispassionately, freely and without the distraction of
wide public surveillance.
2) A defendant on trial for a specific crime is entitled to his
day in court, not in a stadium, or a city or nation-wide arena.
3) Furthermore, telecasting may also deprive an accused of
effective counsel. The distractions, intrusions into confidential
attorney-client relationships and the temptation offered by
television to play to the audience might often have a direct effect
not only upon
the lawyers, but the judge, the jury and the
61
witnesses.
While all of the court's arguments could be assailed for their
heavyhandedness, they nevertheless reflect the concern for the
accused which overrides that of all others at trial. Only the second
argument seems to be indisputable, however, it seems more
amenable to a discussion of legal prejudice than psychological
distraction. The defendant's real concern is that a trial judge may
indiscriminately select his trial for telecast as opposed to any
number of others for reasons not always geared to the furtherance of
the pursuit of justice.
(v) The Television Audience:
The Estes court alluded on several occasions to the potential
distorting effect of televised court trials on the viewing audience.
Weaned on Perry Mason, home viewers are generally ignorant of
the workings of the court and, it is argued, television may not be
ideally suited to clearing up the problem. The potential to reach a
wide market places television at the top of the media list so far as its
use as an educational tool is concerned. However, the court
recognized several factors inherent in the broadcasting industry that
61. Id. at 549-50
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would militate against the "educational" use of network television.
Among them are the following: a) in Estes, the notoriety of the trial
led viewers to tune in more for macabre reasons than out of concern
for learning the court process; 62 b) the commercial nature of
television would force industry executives to hone in on the most
titillating of cases so as to ensure sponsorship and high ratings; 6 3 c)
the editing process can have dire effects on the final product as seen
by the public. Much of what the court would deem of educational
value would likely wind up on the cutting-room floor6 4 and d) the
natural tendency of the public is to forget the life-and-death aspect
of a trial and view it instead as entertainment. 6 5 The Court has held
that since the public obtains wrong impressions as to the purpose of
the trials, the dignity and decorum of the proceedings is eroded and
any educational value pales alongside the overall detriment to the
judicial system.
Psychologists and sociologists have devoted untold hours of
research to the impact of television in general upon its legions of
viewers. Still, there remain far more questions than answers; the
issue of courtroom television has become yet another unanswered
question. One thing is certain, however. A generation raised on trial
television cannot help but have a significantly different view of the
administration of justice than, say, our own generation. As to what
precise shape the differing attitudes would take, it is impossible to
say and dangerous to speculate upon. Again, the situation begs for
more empirical evidence.
(c) Legal prejudiceto the accused's right to fair trial.

Chief Justice Warren, in opening his judgement in Estes, stated:
I believe it violates the Sixth Amendment for federal courts and
the Fourteenth Amendment for state courts to allow criminal
trials to be televised to the public at large. I base this conclusion
on three grounds:. .

subjects

.

3) that it singles out certain defendants and

them to trials under prejudicial

experienced by others. 66

conditions

not

This comment indicates that to Chief Justice Warren's mind both
the selection of a trial for telecast and the ensuing telecast itself are
62. Id. at 592 (per Harlan, J.)
63. Id. at 571-4 (per Warren, C. J.)

64. Id. at 574 (per Warren, C. J.)
65. Id. at 575 (per Warren, C. J.)
66. Id. at 565
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latently prejudicial to the accused's right of fair trial. Much of what
has already been discussed in the previoius two subsections goes
toward answering -

or, in this case, supporting -

his finding on

the second matter of prejudice in the ensuing trial coverage. As to
the selection itself being prejudicial, there is no doubt that it is,
especially in a case like Estes where the complaints of the accused
fell upon deaf ears. A judge may, in effect, hand-pick a certain trial
for coverage on the basis of, say, its educational value. This should
never override the accused's right, however, to withhold his
consent, thereby banning the televised broadcast. It is interesting to
note that the Zamora case in Florida was chosen for television after
a year of fruitless search by jurists who consistently ran into the
67
defendant's veto power.
(d) Summary: Arguments Against Televised Trials
1) Physical disruption to the trial proceedings was a factor in Estes,
but even there the justices held the door open for the advent of
improved technology. An accused would likely have little success
today if he based his argument in support of television prejudice on
the physical disruption of the proceedings, unless matters grew
badly out of hand.
2) Psychological distraction of the participants of a trial is a
complex area still in its research infancy. It has been shown that
jurors are the most susceptible to in-court prejudice of a
psychological nature, though, interestingly enough, the influencing
takes place outside the courtroom by way of family and friends or
even the nightly viewing of their own performance that day. With
respect to witnesses and the quality of their testimony, many of the
problems regarding television are markedly similar to those already
posed by the presence of the press. The difference here is one of
degree and not kind, and television, arguably, may push certain
witnesses past the breaking point. Judges, with ample cooperation
from the TV industry, can likely fend for themselves despite having
to assume certain new supervisory roles during trial. This is not to
imply however that judges as a class are anymore steely-minded
than the rest of the trial actors. The defendant, since in many cases
he is not required to testify, will not be unduly affected directly by
the cameras presence. He will be indirectly affected psychologically
67. See In re Petition of Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc. for Change in
Code of JudicialConduct (1977), 347 So. 2d 402
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by the camera's effects on other participants and the general
atmosphere within the courtroom. The viewing public will almost
certainly be affected in one way or another, but this area must be left
to the social scientists for determination, and not to the courts.
3) Legal prejudice to the accused is a twofold evil. His right to a
fair trial can be violated by abuses for any of the above reasons.
Furthermore, the mere selection of his trial for television coverage
can be prejudicial to him unless he is guaranteed the right to veto the
court's decision by withholding his consent.
3. Rebuttal: The Case For Television
Proponents of courtroom television have always been disadvantaged
by the two-step process they require to argue their case. First off,
they must neutralize the welter of arguments raised by the Estes
decision. Once done, they must drive home their own arguments,
namely that televised trials would serve a valuable educational
function, would enhance the public's right to know, and would
remove from television its unwarranted status as media "secondclass citizen."
Mr. Justice Otto Moore in the Colorado reference concerning
Canon 35 was, in effect, the first crusader in support of television's
presence inside the courtroom. 68 Like others who would follow
him, Justice Moore canvassed most of the arguments raised in
support of Canon 35, then systematically shot them down.
Regarding the contention that television would "amount to
entering the field of entertainment", the justice referred to the
Supreme Court's ruling in Winters v. New York which held that
what "is one man's amusement, teaches another's doctrine." ,69
He then challenged the notion that some trial participants would
seize the opportunity to "play to the galleries", including
publicity-hungry lawyers and judges. In his experience, Mr. Justice
Moore found that the exact opposite actually came to pass. Lawyers
and judges acted far more diligently with far less inconsequential
squabbling under the watchful eye of television. Furthermore, he
reasoned that a loutish individual on camera was likely no different
under normal circumstances:
.. . A constitutional right of all citizens cannot be denied
because a very few persons may conceivably make fools of
68. In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35 of the Canons of JudicialEthics (1956),
296 P.2d 465 (Colo. Sup. Ct. en banc)
69. (1947), 333 U.S. 507 at 510
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themselves before a larger audience than that0 which might
otherwise be subjected to their offensive conduct. 7
He then disposed of two other possible problems, the accused's
right of privacy and the threat of media overkill and its pernicious
effect on the decorum of the proceedings. The trial, he maintained
was a public event and the law recognized no privacy right attaching
thereto. Pooling resources, he concluded, was the court's guarantee
against the dangers of a journalistic mob. He further suggested the
establishment of a full-time Media-Bar organization charged with
full responsibility for in-court broadcasts.
Jerome Wilson takes the interesting approach that it is the courts
that need television and not the reverse as goes the conventional
argument. He says that court coverage would generally speaking be
far down the list of a station manager's priorities:
.. . At best, from a pure television standpoint, courtroom stories
are static visually; they tie up film crews for an inordinate amount
of time; and sometimes the proceedings are difficult for the
average person to understand. 71
He adds:
...

Without .

.

. television coverage, the nation's primary

means of news communication, the judicial system is sinking
slowly into obscurity. As for television, it's doing just fine . .. 72
But this notwithstanding, he still argues strongly for the presence of
cameras-in-the-courtroom. Wilson notes that the use of a single
camera shooting noiselessly with natural light would effectively
solve the problem of physical disruptions. He discounts the
importance of this complaint in any case, since Canon 3A(7) allows
for television cameras for educational purposes. The cameras are
just as likely or unlikely to disrupt trials singled out for their
educational value as any others, and yet they are allowed. Nor do
his own experiences support the view that cameras psychologically
distract trial participants. They are, he suggests, quickly forgotten
once the proceedings begin.
Wilson also suggests that far from impairing the dignity and
decorum of the trial, television can actually safeguard it by
preventing breaches in dignity by judges who might bully, lawyers
70. In re HearingsConcerning Canon 35 of the Canons ofJudicialEthics (1956),

296 P.2d 465 at 470
71. J. Wilson, Justice in Living Color: The Casefor Courtroom Television (1974),

60 A.B.A.J. 294 at 294.
72. Id.
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who might grandstand or both, should they act in concert to
intimidate the accused or the witnesses. He also agrees with the
author that the effects registered upon a viewing audience of a
televised trial are not properly judicial concerns.
Regarding the educational value argument, Wilson recognizes
that many of the Justices in Estes supported the notion. Mr. Justice
Harlan, for example, said that television would serve an educational
purpose by "acquainting the public with the judicial process in
action," though he felt these were "not arguments of constitutional
proportions. ' 73 He also takes the approach that no other medium is
more suited to engendering public interest in the court's
proceedings. He quotes former CBS President Frank Stanton as
commenting that:
.. . Misconstructions, misinterpretations, and distortions of
court decisions are inevitable if the only voices in government to
whom the people are denied direct access are the voices of the
74
judges.
One of the more concise and informative statements on the
beneficial aspects of courtroom television was written recently by
Stone and Edlin. They conclude that:
• . .televising of trials can be both an effective teaching tool and
socialization device. It could disseminate not only an academic
understanding of judicial processes and their relationship to
individuals, but also could raise in the consciousness of viewers
ideals of individual rights and responsibilities in relation to the
system. This would make the viewers more aware of their own
rights and responsibilities in our75society, which our judicial
system is entrusted with enforcing
By now it should be quite apparent that there is no clear-cut path to a
solution to the questions involved in the challenge of courtroom
broadcasting. In terms of sheer volume, the arguments opposing the
expansion of news coverage inside the courtroom seem to hold
sway. Viewed from the perspective of the swinging pendulum, the
mood of the United States seems more strongly in favour of
expanding the courtroom walls to encompass home viewers than
ever before. Back in 1956, the Colorado reference attempted to see
for itself what positive and negative forces came into play when
television cameras were permitted entry into the court. Today, a
73. (1964), 381 U.S. 532 at 589
74. Supra, note 71 at 296
75. Supra, note 54 at 1132
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whole wave of states are picking up on Colorado's initiative in a
move to sort out the matter for themselves. All of the experiments
have proved illuminating, but two in particular are worthy of note.
IV. State v. Solorzano . .76
At 8:00 p.m. on the evening of June 28, 1976, residents of Las
Vegas, Nevada who happened to be tuned to station KLAS-TV, a
CBS affiliate, had the unique opportunity of sitting in on local
history in the making. For the first time ever in Nevada, the public
was afforded direct contact with a criminal trial through the medium
of television. Telecast in the form of a four-part documentary
entitled, "Justice: The State of Nevada v. Xavier P. Solorzano",
five hours worth of edited videotape of the actual trial of an illegal
alien charged with the attempted murder of his wife was broadcast
to any or all of the 132,000 television households in the area.
A year earlier, almost to the day, trial judge Carl J. Christensen
began the proceedings against Solorzano in a courtroom outfitted
with two videotape TV cameras. The consent of all parties involved
had been secured and three conditions had been imposed on the
television station: a) no physical obstruction of the proceedings
would be tolerated; b) no portion of the trial could be broadcast until
all avenues of appeal had been exhausted and c) the above
mentioned consent requirement.
Nevada court rules and state regulations conformed closely with
the wording of Canon 3A(7). In order to follow through with the
Solorzano project the court had to bend the rules somewhat. It was
felt that the proposed delayed broadcast eminating videotaped from
the network studio and not the courtroom excepted Solorzano from
the regulations and, furthermore, the educational nature of the
broadcast brought it within the ambit of Canon 3A(7).
Goldman and Larson agree that Solorzano was selected as a trial
balloon for two reasons. 1) The fact situation and predicted length
of the trial brought it well within the budgetary constraints of the
station, 77 as opposed to a different type of trial involving more
witnesses and longer proceedings; 2) It was felt that the viewing
public could readily identify with a crime such as this, i.e. the
attempted murder of a wife following a marital argument in a
barroom.
76.

Supra, note 40 for a complete discussion of this case.
77. Id. at 2035 n.251
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Every moment of courtroom proceedings was videotaped,
totalling some 35 hours. The jury deliberations went unfilmed.
Jurors were sequestered throughout the trial. The coverage was
done by two videotape cameras directed by technicians outside the
courtroom and operated by two in-court cameramen. The cameras
were positioned to the left of the jury box and behind the spectator
gallery respectively. On the final day of trial one camera was
brought forward opposite the bench to better record the judgment.
The end-product was five hours worth of documentary film, with
scant interludes of narration and commercial breaks timed so as not
to leave viewers hanging. At the start and finish of each telecast, a
brief reenactment of the crime and taped interviews with some of the
principals of the trial were aired to flesh out the program. Yet, there
was no mistake as to the intention of the TV producers, as Goldman
and Larson note:
Foremost in the mind of the director was 'how to maintain
fidelity to the actual events in the courtroom presenting them in
an accurate and truthful context, without sacrificing all dramatic
and aesthetic standards'
The director intended to present the trial in much the same way as
an ordinary courtroom spectator would have observed 78the
process, with all the feelings of interest, drama and boredom.
Despite conditions that one might call "laboratory"
or
experimental and levels of cooperation heretofore unheard of, it is
important to realize that Solorzano remained a bona fide legal trial
with no guarantees that a ruling of the court would not at a later date
be overturned due to the telecast. With the fate of the accused on the
line, the media's performance took on exceptional importance.
Solorzano was found guilty of battery with intent to kill and was
sentenced to five years imprisonment. There was no appeal based
on courtroom television. That, in itself, was a major achievement
for the rule in Estes remained a tenacious precedent up until that
time. As there was no in-court debate about the propriety of
televising the proceedings, it was left to the participants following
the trial to comment on their impressions of the trial. Solorzano
stands in total opposition to the findings in Estes. Two
similarly-styled fact situations, both with the same narrow issue,
had yielded two conflicting decisions. The following comments
78. Id. at 2038 as quoted from the statements of Stuart Murtland
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from participants in the Solorzano trial will be useful in establishing
that none of the prophecies of doom in Estes are inherent in a
televised trial:
Judge Christensen:
During the trial the lawyers, the witnesses and I as the judge tried
just a little bit harder to carry out our roles to perfection ....
Our adversary system is often not fully understood by our
citizenry and I feel that this televised production has helped the
general public to better understand our system of justice ....
This awareness (of the cameras) by everyone appeared to me to
result in a conscientious desire on the part of everyone to do his
best. The proceedings in the courtroom were marked by
seriousness, attitude, dress, demeanour, and other characteristics
of concern and attention that both judges and lawyers strive for in
a jury trial ....
Defense Counsel Phil Pro:
. . . in my opinion, the fact that the trial was being video-taped

had no visible adverse effect on the jurors, judge, witnesses,
attorneys, or most important, Xavier Solorzano ....
The cameras, sound equipment, and T.V. personnel were
remarkably unnoticeable during the trial and provided no source
of distraction for the participants in my opinion ...
Prosecutor Robert E. Wolf:
To be quite candid, I would have to say that I was periodically
conscious of the cameras and realized that we could not cut and
reshoot. At the time I felt the television aspect was one more
problem or pressure that had to be overcome along with the
marshalling of the facts, presentation of evidence, and winning
the case before the jury. I would have to conclude, therefore, that
the presence of television or motion picture cameras during a jury
trial has somewhat of a negative effect on an attorney's
performance...
Regardless of any entertainment factors, I feel that the public
reaps a benefit in viewing realities versus the imagery of
television law programs. Because of our form of government I
feel that such an educational input to the public is essential.
Jury Foreman John G. Carter:
It is my personal belief the television cameras neither distracted
nor influenced
the jury, prosecution, defense, or witnesses in this
79
case.
In summarizing the importance of this case in relation to those
that had gone before, Goldman and Larson state unequivocally:
.. . unlike the forecast in Estes, the participants in Solorzano
79. Id. at 2062-7 (Appendix)
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reacted to the camera in a positive manner consonant with the
requirements of justice. Even the one attorney who felt the
camera may have "somewhat of a negative effect on an
attorney's performance," did not proffer any specific instance of
prejudice that would render the proceedings suspect. The
remaining data indicate the 'awareness' of the camera simply
acted as a catalyst to heighten individual performances. Thus,
unlike the Supreme Court's hypothesis in Estes that the camera
would obstruct justice, the Soloranzo experience provides an
actual empirical basis, and leads the reasonable man to conclude
that the presence of the television news camera during trial is a
benign - if not beneficial - influence. 80
V. State v. Zamora . . .
On a petition to the Florida Supreme Court by the Florida
Post-Newsweek TV stations, the court held that any modifications
to the state's Canon 3A(7) would hinge on the results of a one-year
experimental program of televised courtroom coverage. A welldefined set of operational guidelines laid out by the court in Petition
of Post-Newsweek Stations Florida, Inc. for Change in the Code of
Judicial Conduct were to serve as the ground rules for the
program. 8 ' No final report on the success or failure of the overall
program has yet been proffered for public consumption. What is
known is that no single case up to and including those in progress on
the July 5, 1978 closing date offered the courts more difficulty than
82
the inaugural case of State v. Zamora.
As fate would have it, in Zamora the defendant relied on the
excesses of television in general to plead his case. If the television
experiment failed, he would be in the unique position of pleading a
second type of television excess on appeal, namely in-court
telecasting to the detriment of his constitutional right of a fair trial.
If this sounds slightly confusing, take heart - it was.
The defendant Ronnie Zamora, 15, was charged with first degree
murder in the death of his 82-year-old neighbour. The woman was
killed while Zamora and a friend were in the act of burglarizing her
home. Zamora's ingenious defense counsel argued that the lad was
suffering "involuntary subliminal television intoxication" at the
time he commited the act. Judge H. Paul Baker rejected the defense
in the state's first ever televised trial. The uniqueness of the
80. Id. at 2040-1
81. (1977), 347 So. 2d 404 at 405-6
82. (1977), No. 77-25123-A (Dade County Cir. Ct.)
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defense, i.e. that Zamora's incessant diet of police and detective
shows such as Kojak had left him "intoxicated" and unable to
distinguish between truth and televised fiction, had stirred
worldwide publicity and easily surpassed the public interest that a
case like Estes had generated. In all, several million people viewed
one stage or another of the trial, broadcast live and, under terms of
the guidelines, without the consent of the defendant. Despite the
potential for abuse of due process and infringement of Zamora's fair
trial rights, there was no suggestion of any prejudice to the accused.
Trial Judge Baker said the television aspect of the trial "must be
83
viewed as a success."
Zamora is likely even more consequential a case than Solorzano,
which in its own right went a long way toward sounding the death
knell of the Estes ruling. Zamora has already been hailed as the case
that broke Canon 3A(7)'s back, a sentiment shared by many authors
and by trial Judge Baker:
The television and audio equipment used during the course of the
Zamora trial produced no distracting sound or light in the opinion
of the court. In speaking privately with the jurors at the
conclusion of the trial, the Court ascertained that the presence of
cameras (both still and televisoin) was slightly distracting but not
to the extent that it interfered with the jurors considering the
testimony and being able to concentrate on the argument of
counsel and the court's instructions.
Justice Clark made reference to the "telltale red lights" on the
television cameras which would distract the jury. No such lights
were present on the cameras used throughout the Zamora trial.
Justice Clark felt the jurors' eyes would be fixed on the cameras
rather than the witnesses. This court took particular note of the
jurors throughout the trial and such was not the case. Concern
was expressed in Estes that jurors would be subject to seeing
portions of the trial on television or hearing broadcast
commentary. This was avoided in the instant trial as previously
discussed.84

In his report, Judge Baker further refuted the Estes rationale by
finding no detrimental effect on the quality of witness testimony, no
physical disruptions to the trial proceedings despite extra lighting,
and no noteable prejudice to the defendant, either legal or
83. See H. Baker, Private Report to the Supreme Court of Florida re: Conduct of
Audio-Visual Trial Coverage, at 17
84. Id. at 4
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psychological.
It is clear from both the Solorzano and Zamora trials that
television coverage of criminal trials is not, as the U.S. Supreme
Court maintained in Estes, inherently prejudicial to the defendant's
right to a fair trial under the due process clause. The time is indeed
ripe for a reconsideration by the highest court in America of its
holding in that pivotal case.
VI. Recommendations:ProposedGuidelinesfor the Future
Of the 14 or more American states now employing television
cameras in their courtrooms on a full-time or experimental basis,
Alabama arguably has devised the most practicable code of
85
procedure. The Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics No. 3A(7A)
reworked in certain areas so as to dovetail with the Canadian court
system, would provide an excellent starting point for the regulation
of news cameras in the courtroom in Canada. Of course, the
Alabama plan is not ideally-suited to Canadian courtroom
conditions or television operations; however, it does represent a
comprehensive scheme not far removed from what the author would
envisage as a viable Canadian framework for televising court trials.
As reworked, the plan provides:
A trial judge, in the exercise of sound discretion, may authorize
the broadcasting, televising, recording or taking of photographs
in a courtroom during a trial or other judicial hearing;
a) provided the Supreme Court of that province has authorized
a plan for the courtroom in which the photographing, recording
or broadcasting by radio or television will occur. The authorized
plan shall set forth the safeguards to ensure that such
photographing, recording or broadcasting by radio or television
of such proceedings will not detract from the dignity of the court
proceedings, distract any witness from giving testimony, degrade
the court, or otherwise interfere with the achievement of a fair
trial and shall further set forth where cameras, lights, wires and
transmitting devices may be located and other details, including,
but not limited to, the area of movement of media personnel.
Prior to the Supreme Court's approval of such a plan, a petition
shall have been filed with the Supreme Court signed by the
presiding judge of the trial, the Crown Prosecutor, President of
the local Barrister's Society and the appointed officer of the
media group seeking to televise the trial.
b) Provided further, if the case is a criminal proceeding, all
85. (1976), 37 Ala. Law. 11 at 16-7
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accused persons who will be before the court during any such
photographing recording or broadcasting by television or radio,
as well as the Crown Prosecutor representing the AttorneyGeneral, shall have affirmatively given their written consent to
the photographing, recording or broadcasting by television or
radio.
However, the judge shall immediately suspend or stop any
photographing, recording or broadcasting by television or radio
at any time that a witness who is testifying, a parent or guardian
of any testifying witness who is a minor, or a juror, party or
counsel expressly objects to the photographing, recording or
broadcasting by television or radio.
An example of a detailed plan that gained acceptance of the
Alabama Supreme Court and, it is submitted, would likewise be
accepted by a Canadian court contained the following extract on the
subject of news coverage:
"The trial judge may authorize the broadcasting, televising,
recording or taking of photographs for news purposes (hereinafter
referred to as media coverage) in a courtroom during trial of other
judicial hearings, provided that:
A) the appropriate media representative shall make timely
request for the same prior to the trial or the event desired to be
broadcast, televised, recorded or photographed out of the presence
of the jury and the request shall specify the particular event or
events to be broadcast, televised, recorded or photographed;
B) in the event the trial judge is agreeable to the request, he shall
make the request known to counsel for all parties with the additional
request that they contact their respective clients. The consent of all
attorneys and parties to the media coverage requested shall be in
writing, signed by each one on forms prepared for that purpose. If it
is desired that the testimony of a witness be covered by the media,
the consent of that witness in writing must also be obtained. The
consent of the jury must be obtained which shall be made part of the
record;
C) in the event a party or witness is a minor, the consent of the
party or witness and that of his parent or guardian must be obtained
in writing. As used herein "party" or "witness" shall include
parents or guardian if the party or witness is under 18 years of age,
provided that if the disability of non-age of a minor has been
removed, the minor may give his own consent;
D) any juror, party, criminal defendant, or witness may request
coverage to cease or withdraw his consent by notifying the judge, in
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which event the judge shall require the media photo and recording
coverage to cease:
E) consent, once given, or refusal of the same, or withdrawal of
the same shall apply equally to all the news media: that is, consent
may not be given, refused or withdrawn as to one type of media and
given, refused or withdrawn as to another type;
F) the trial judge may stop such media coverage when, in his
discretion, the same interferes with the orderly conduct of the trial
or becomes distracting;
G) nothing contained in this plan shall be construed to preclude
the coverage of a trial by a news reporter who is not using a camera
or electronic equipment in connection therewith, but is taking notes,
making sketches, etc.; such a reporter will be considered as a
member of the public;
H) no interviews of jurors, witnesses or parties shall be permitted
during the course of the media coverage, until the jury returns its
verdict.
I) no juvenile proceedings or youthful offender requests,
hearings, pleas or trials may be covered by the news media;
J) members of the media covering the event subject to media
coverage will avoid all distractions and will remain in the area
designated by the court during the time they are covering the event;
K) not more than two still cameramen and two television cameras
will be permitted to cover the event while the court is in session.
They are to remain seated to the extent that it is practicable. The
court may limit the media coverage if the size of the courtroom,
security or crowded conditions require, and shall consider the
priority of media coverage requests. In the event this becomes
necessary, media may pool its coverage.
VII. Conclusions
There is no doubt that many questions remain to be resolved in this
controversial area of procedural law. Even the more recent
American decisions analysed above point out glaring deficiencies in
television coverage of trial proceedings, not the least of which is
what will transpire when the so-called laboratory-like conditions no
longer exist? Will the broadcast industry backslide? Will they make
excessive new demands on the judicial system that will render
justice a sham and relegate it to a backseat position behind
entertainment. And what of the special anomalous cases that
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unquestionably fall outside the scope of possible television cases,
i.e. those involving rape, child custody, undercover agents, etc.?
This list of possible inquiries is seemingly endless.
Yet, this article has shown that to artificially stem the tide of
support for televising trials, as Estes and Canon 3A(7) arguably
have done, is akin to placing a finger in the dike. Through
cooperative effort of bench and bar and the media, plans for the
coverage of court proceedings that are fair to all concerned can be
established as in Florida, Colorado and Nevada. Guided by the just
supervision of the trial judge and the pooled resources of the TV
industry, no spectacles such as Estes need ever darken the legal
horizon again. In conclusion, then, a televised court trial has been
proven to be well within the reach of mortal men and well within
their capacity to act fairly, reasonably and responsibly. There is no
apparent reason at this time why the practice of courtroom television
should not go forth and multiply - even into Canada!
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